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ABSTRACT 
 Numerous studies from various research groups have already shown the usefulness of 
alcohol expectancies as predictors of long-term future alcohol consumption. The present study 
extends this line of research by directly testing whether alcohol expectancies measured in the 
moment using free association are useful as predictors of alcohol consumption in the next few 
hours. An ecological momentary assessment (EMA) procedure was used to examine how alcohol 
expectancies might fluctuate during days in which many people expect to drink (e.g. Fridays, 
Saturdays) and how these fluctuations in alcohol expectancies might predict future drinking 
and/or co-vary with important contextual variables during that same day. The results supported 
our main hypothesis that increases in positively-valenced alcohol expectancies would be 
observed a few hours to minutes before engaging in alcohol consumption. These findings 
provide further evidence that anticipatory information processing is a key part of the 
motivational system that directs future behavior, and that probing expectancies in real-time can 
be useful for predicting alcohol consumption in the near future.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
Excessive alcohol consumption (i.e. heavy drinking and alcohol use disorders) has a 
significant negative impact on communities in the United States every year. This negative impact 
ranges from thousands of people who are killed in alcohol-impaired driving accidents to billions 
of dollars lost due to medical expenses and wasted earnings (Research Society on Alcoholism, 
2015). Given this negative impact, it is important to understand the variety of motivational 
factors that influence the decision to drink alcohol excessively. One such factor that has 
consistently been found to influence, and be influenced by, alcohol consumption is alcohol 
expectancy (Sher, Grekin, & Williams, 2005; Jester et al., 2014). Since expectancy processes are 
theorized to guide basic behavioral functioning and even sensory perception (Bar, 2011; Lupyan 
& Clark, 2015), it is reasonable to assume that expectancy processes are involved in the full 
range of alcohol-related behaviors, ranging from abstinence or moderate usage to pathology and 
excessive consumption. 
What are Expectancies? 
Generally, expectancies are thought to be based primarily on associations among content 
that is stored in our memory, while the associations themselves are based on our past experiences 
(Bar, 2011; Goldman, 2002; Goldman & Reich, 2013). An expectancy, or “expectation”, occurs 
when a piece of information stored in memory that is activated further activates other connected 
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pieces of information (i.e. those pieces that are similar in some way; “associations”); these 
activated associations then generate predictions that prepare us for future circumstances by 
anticipating what we will experience next (i.e. “expectancy”) (Bar, 2011; Goldman, 2002; 
Goldman, Darkes, Reich, & Brandon, 2010). Since these predictions reflect our prior knowledge 
about the world, expectancies may be at the core of the predictive processing that is hypothesized 
to underlie our perceptual experiences of the world (Lupyan & Clark, 2015; Goldman et al., 
2010). In the context of reward learning and motivated behavior, expectancies are thought to be 
the cognitive representations of the causal relationship between engaging in a behavior and 
receiving a rewarding outcome (Berridge, 2001). Thus, the expectancy process and reward 
learning are vital to an organism’s survival because it allows the organism to adapt and adjust its 
behaviors in order to prepare for upcoming situations, both near (e.g. the next moment) and 
distant (e.g. a year from now), which increases its odds of survival (Goldman, 2002; Goldman et 
al., 2010). 
Given that associations and expectancies are based on past experiences, it is apparent that 
expectancies are influenced by culture, in that they can represent information acquired from 
immediate social contexts, family environments, and larger communal systems. That is, 
expectancies are shaped by an individual’s past experiences with his environment, which 
includes the socially shared information that is learned from engaging with other people (i.e. 
culture; Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles, 2010). It should not be surprising that culture shapes 
expectancies, since substantial evidence indicates that culture has strongly influenced human 
biology and psychology, ranging from genetics and brains to concepts and behavior (Laland, 
Odling-Smee, & Myles, 2010; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; ojalehto & Medin, 2015). Indeed, 
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specific expectancies related to alcohol use have been found to be socially-shared and 
transmitted (Donovan, Molina, & Kelly, 2009). The existence of alcohol expectancies in children 
before they ever engage in alcohol consumption also provides strong evidence that expectancies 
are socially-learned (Christiansen, Goldman, & Inn, 1982; Jester et al., 2014). Therefore, 
expectancies result from the activation of associations that are stored in memory that then 
anticipate future situations and allow an organism to adapt to maximize survival; in humans, this 
entire process is strongly influenced by an individual’s culture. Consequently, the phrase 
“alcohol expectancies” can be thought of simply as applying this entire expectancy process to the 
domain of alcohol consumption. 
Many theories of substance use and addiction include some form of the expectancy 
concept as an important feature in the development and continuation of substance use disorders, 
although they do not always explicitly use the term “expectancy”. For instance, the sensitized 
incentive salience theory of addiction suggests that sensitization (“hypersensitivity”) to drug 
stimuli and drug effects is at the core of addiction, but the behavioral manifestations of this 
sensitization are strongly influenced by whether or not a drug is expected in a given context 
(Robinson & Berridge, 2003; Robinson & Berridge, 2008). Proponents of the incentive salience 
view have also argued that both incentive salience and cognitive expectation processes can 
simultaneously motivate behavior and are involved in reward learning (Berridge, 2001). In the 
stimulus-response (‘habit’) learning theory of addiction, conditioned stimuli and reinforcers that 
predict (i.e. anticipate) the rewarding effects of a drug eventually initiate and maintain 
compulsive drug seeking behaviors (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). Even the opponent-process 
theory of addiction, which emphasizes the role of a withdrawal/negative affect stage in an 
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addiction cycle, also includes a stage that highlights the addict’s preoccupation with and 
anticipation of a drug’s rewarding effects (Koob & Le Moal, 2008b). Another hypothesis of the 
opponent-process theory, namely that allostatic changes fail to return to the original homeostatic 
state because of “anticipated” challenges to homeostasis, also assumes that an expectancy 
process is in operation (Koob & Le Moal, 2008a; Goldman, 2002). Similarly, alcohol 
expectancies play a key role in some relatively recent dual-process theories of alcohol 
consumption and addiction (Moss & Albery, 2009; Wiers et al., 2007; Stacy & Wiers, 2010). 
Therefore, although theories of substance use and addiction do not always explicitly use the 
word “expectancy”, the common theme of anticipatory information processing (e.g. 
“expectancy”, “anticipation”, “prediction”, “preoccupation”, etc.) is often included as an 
important feature in those theories (see Reich and Goldman [2014] for a discussion of different 
words that have been used to describe the common theme of anticipatory information processing 
for alcohol use). Thus, there is a large body of scientific evidence and theory to suggest that what 
people expect drinking alcohol will do for them before they start drinking on any given day has a 
significant impact on their decisions related to drinking alcohol.    
Are Expectancies Implicit or Explicit? 
Expectancies can be measured either explicitly (i.e. with conscious awareness) or 
implicitly (i.e. without conscious awareness) depending on the methodology used for a given 
study (Goldman, Reich, & Darkes, 2006). In the context of substance use, however, expectancies 
are sometimes described as merely explicit, verbal declarations or propositional beliefs that an 
individual has about using a particular substance (e.g. Robinson & Berridge, 2003; Wiers et al., 
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2007; Wiers & Stacy, 2012; Stacy & Wiers, 2010). On the other hand, others have argued that 
expectancies can operate implicitly, as well as explicitly (Moss & Albery, 2009; Goldman, 
Reich, & Darkes, 2006; Reich, Below, & Goldman, 2010). Even those who disagree with 
conceptualizing expectancies as implicit associative processes still acknowledge that some 
methods of measuring expectancies can gauge implicit associations if there is a strong 
connection in memory between the stimulus (e.g. alcohol) and the expectancy (e.g. “having fun”; 
Wiers & Stacy, 2012). Since expectancies are based primarily on associations in memory and 
those associations can be activated either implicitly or explicitly (Nelson, McKinney, Gee, & 
Janczura, 1998), it seems unnecessary to restrict associations only to the realm of implicit 
processing and expectancies only to the realm of explicit processing. Similarly, the predictive 
processing underlying our perceptual experiences of the world is thought to be built upon 
generally non-conscious expectations (Lupyan & Clark, 2015; Goldman et al., 2010). Therefore, 
good theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests that expectancies can be measured 
both explicitly and implicitly and can reveal both explicit and implicit cognitive processes.  
Context and Expectancies 
 Although alcohol expectancies measured at a single point in time have often been used as 
long-term predictors of future alcohol use (e.g. Christiansen, Smith, Roehling, & Goldman, 
1989; Jester et al., 2014; Colder et al., 2014), substantial evidence shows that alcohol expectancy 
activation can be highly dependent on the immediate context (Wall, McKee, & Hinson, 2000; 
Wall, McKee, Hinson, & Goldstein, 2001; Monk & Heim, 2013a; Monk & Heim, 2013b; 
LaBrie, Grant, & Hummer, 2011; Reich, Goldman, & Noll, 2004; Reich, Noll, & Goldman, 
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2005; Krank, Wall, Stewart, Wiers, & Goldman, 2005; Cox, Van Enkevort, Hicks, Kahn-
Weintraub, & Morin, 2014). These studies have found that contextual variables such as room 
type (sitting in a bar vs. office room), word presentation (reading “beer” vs. “milk”), and even 
physical balance (feeling balanced vs. unbalanced) can influence whether or not alcohol 
expectancies become activated in memory. Additionally, a relatively recent social-attributional 
theory of alcohol’s effects on mood predicts that the anticipation of unstable, self-relevant 
negative outcomes in a given social context will result in enhanced mood when drinking alcohol 
(Fairbairn & Sayette, 2014). Thus, Fairbairn and Sayette suggest that the relationship between 
alcohol and mood is moderated by the anticipation of the social context’s potential outcomes. 
Furthermore, since both the amount of alcohol consumed and the types of alcohol-related 
problems experienced vary depending on the drinking context (Freisthler, Lipperman-Kreda, 
Bersamin, & Gruenewald, 2014), it is reasonable to predict that cognitive variables that are 
thought to influence drinking, such as expectancies, will also co-vary with the drinking context. 
This prediction is also consist with findings from rat studies which suggest that environmental 
contexts where drug-seeking was initially reinforced (i.e. “learned”) with drug administrations 
can renew drug-seeking behaviors even after the extinction of those same behaviors in a different 
environmental context; this seems to occur despite the fact that the drugs themselves are not 
administered to reinforce the drug-seeking behaviors during re-exposure to the context where the 
initial learning took place (Crombag, Bossert, Koya, & Shaham, 2008). Therefore, cognitive 
variables related to alcohol consumption, such as expectancies, should be especially salient in 
environmental contexts where individuals have previously learned to engage in alcohol-seeking 
behaviors. Further, alcohol expectancies in particular should be sensitive to contextual stimuli 
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that are associated with alcohol, because the perception of those contextual stimuli should lead to 
the anticipation of future alcohol consumption, regardless of whether any alcohol is actually 
present.  
Measuring Expectancies In-vivo  
However, many of the studies that have looked at the relationship between alcohol 
expectancies and context have usually been conducted in laboratory settings or other fairly 
controlled environments that have questionable generalizability to real-life, in-vivo settings. But 
at least one study has examined the covariation of alcohol expectancies and social/environmental 
contexts in-vivo using ecological momentary assessment (EMA; discussed further below) (Monk 
& Heim, 2014). They found that, as predicted, alcohol expectancies do fluctuate in the real world 
depending on a person’s social context (e.g. alone vs. with friends) and environmental context 
(e.g. bar vs. work). Based on these findings, the authors concluded that alcohol expectancies 
should not be considered merely static cognitions; instead expectancies should be viewed as 
fluctuating in synchrony with a person’s immediate context, which is consistent with both 
expectancy theory as a whole and the numerous laboratory studies showing alcohol expectancies 
to be sensitive to contextual differences (Goldman et al., 2010).  
Although Monk and Heim’s (2014) study showed important and novel findings for using 
the EMA measurement procedure in alcohol expectancy research, other important questions 
related to gauging alcohol expectancies in-vivo remain open for exploration. First and foremost 
is the question of whether probing alcohol expectancies in-vivo is a useful indicator of the 
motivational states that guide alcohol-related behaviors in the near future. Since anticipatory 
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cognitive processes have already been shown to be useful as predictors of long-term alcohol use, 
it seems reasonable to hypothesize that these same anticipatory processes will be active proximal 
to short-term alcohol use. A valuable extension to the alcohol expectancy literature might come, 
therefore, from a demonstration that expectancies measured in-vivo can reliably predict alcohol 
consumption in the immediately following hours.  
Second, the timing of repeated-measurements is critical to any longitudinal design, 
including EMA studies; whether or not a relationship between two variables is detected is highly 
dependent on how much time passes between one measurement and the next (Collins & Graham, 
2002). For example, if the next measurement is taken too soon, then it is possible that not enough 
time has passed for the influence of a predictor variable (e.g. initiation of drinking) to be seen in 
the outcome variable (e.g. alcohol-related problems); on the other hand, if the next measurement 
is taken too late, then it is possible that the influence of a predictor variable (e.g. being with 
friends who are drinking) on the outcome variable (e.g. initiation of drinking) has already peaked 
and declined back to an unnoticeable level (Collins & Graham, 2002). Monk and Heim (2014) 
acknowledge some of these issues when they note that their study did not collect measurements 
between the hours of 11pm and 1am, which can be prime drinking time for many drinkers on the 
weekends. Therefore, the time of day when the measurements occur may affect the observed 
relationship between alcohol expectancies and contextual variables. Further, Monk and Heim’s 
(2014) study used measurement intervals that were randomized by 15-minute blocks within 3-
hour periods, so that the time between one measurement and the next could be as short as 30 
minutes or as long as 6 hours. Although such a measurement timing schedule may be ideal for 
simply examining the co-occurrence of contextual variables and alcohol expectancies very 
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generally over the course of a day or week, it is possible that some important relationships 
between context and alcohol expectancies were missed due to the timing of the measurements, 
such as whether certain alcohol expectancies immediately precede and/or follow drinking and the 
occurrence of important contextual variables. The research questions and hypothesized 
relationships between variables should direct not only the methodological design, but also how 
the data is structured and what kinds of statistical analyses are used in longitudinal research (e.g. 
in the case of non-experimental designs, which variable is used as a predictor and which is used 
as an outcome) (Shiffman, 2014).  
Lastly, how alcohol expectancies are measured could also impact the findings of 
naturalistic, in-vivo measurements. As discussed previously, alcohol expectancies can be 
measured implicitly or explicitly. Although implicit and explicit measures of alcohol 
expectancies share a lot of the same variance in predicting alcohol use/problems, each type of 
measure does seem to have some unique ability to predict alcohol use/problems independent of 
the other (Reich et al., 2010). This finding that implicit and explicit measures of alcohol 
expectancies may uniquely predict alcohol consumption is consistent with the idea that both 
implicit and explicit cognitive processes play important and at least partially distinct roles in 
substance use and addiction (Moss & Albery, 2009; Wiers et al., 2007; Stacy & Wiers, 2010). 
Because the findings of Monk and Heim (2014) are based on a small number of more explicit 
alcohol expectancy questions taken from an expectancy questionnaire, it is possible that 
measures which probe the more implicit operation of alcohol expectancies (e.g. free association; 
discussed further below) could also be useful for examining the covariation of alcohol 
expectancies and contextual variables. 
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The Present Study 
 To our knowledge, no published study has tested whether alcohol expectancies measured 
in-vivo can reliably predict future alcohol consumption later on in the same day. Such a study 
would be a valuable test of alcohol expectancy theory, given that a key proposition of expectancy 
theory is that anticipatory information processing and the resulting anticipatory “mindset” (i.e. 
the collection of predictions that are activated in the mind at any particular moment; Bar, 2011) 
are crucial for decision making and guiding future behavior (Reich & Goldman, 2014). 
Numerous studies from various research groups have already shown the usefulness of 
expectancies as predictors of long-term future alcohol consumption. The present study extends 
this line of research by directly testing whether alcohol expectancies measured in-vivo and in the 
moment (i.e. state-like expectancies) are useful as predictors of alcohol consumption in the next 
few hours.  
In keeping with recent exhortations to use electronic technologies to monitor alcohol-
related behaviors and cognitions in real-time and naturalistic environments (Chung & Hilton, 
2014), the general purpose of the present study was to measure alcohol expectancies outside of 
the laboratory and in natural settings using repeated, in-vivo measurements. More specifically, 
the goal was to capture alcohol expectancies shortly before, during, and after the occurrence of 
drinking and/or contextually important drinking variables (e.g. being with friends who are 
drinking). Another goal was to obtain more implicit measurements of alcohol expectancies in 
naturalistic environments, since there is substantial evidence (discussed previously) to suggest 
that implicit measurements of alcohol expectancies are sensitive to contextual variables. Implicit 
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measurements of alcohol expectancies may be more sensitive to context than explicit 
measurements because explicit measurements are more likely to include context within the 
questions themselves (e.g. “Having a few drinks was a nice way to celebrate special occasions.”) 
and suggest a more trait-like response from participants, while implicit measurements often do 
not include as much contextual information. Repeated in-vivo assessments of alcohol 
expectancies essentially guarantee that contextual variables will vary, and thus allow for a closer 
look at the covariation of contextual variables and implicitly measured alcohol expectancies. 
More concretely, we examined how alcohol expectancies fluctuated over the course of an 
evening in which many people expect to drink (e.g. Friday, Saturday nights), and how these 
fluctuations in alcohol expectancies predicted future drinking and/or co-vary with important 
contextual variables during that same evening.  
Since expectancies are theorized to be part of the motivational system that directs future 
behavior (Bar, 2011; Goldman, 2002; Goldman et al., 2010) and positive alcohol expectancies 
measured a year or more in advance have been empirically shown to predict future alcohol 
consumption (Christiansen et al., 1989; Jester et al., 2014; Colder et al., 2014), it is reasonable to 
expect that this predictive relationship will be seen in a short time interval as well; and so 
increases in positively-valenced alcohol expectancies should be observed a few hours to minutes 
before engaging in alcohol consumption. If a buildup of positively-valenced alcohol expectancies 
can be reliably detected in individuals who go on to consume alcohol later in the day, then this 
finding would support the idea that anticipatory information processing happening in the moment 
is involved in determining which behaviors occur in the near future. This hypothesis is consistent 
with an EMA study that found that drinkers with high positive sociability expectancies measured 
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only at baseline self-reported increased levels of positive affect in the hours immediately 
preceding the consumption of their first alcoholic drink in a given day (Treloar, Piasecki, 
McCarthy, Sher, & Heath, 2015). This hypothesis was also supported by studies that found 
enhancement drinking motives (which is a cognitive construct that is very similar to positive 
alcohol expectancies) measured only at baseline can predict future drinking levels and moderate 
the relationships between contextual variables, drinking levels, and positive appraisals of drinks 
that were measured using EMA techniques (Smit, Groefsema, Luijten, Engels, & Kuntsche, 
2015; Gautreau, Sherry, Battista, Goldstein, & Stewart, 2015; Piasecki et al., 2014). 
We also hypothesized an increase in positively-valenced alcohol expectancies when 
people are in contexts where they have learned from past experiences to expect heavy alcohol 
consumption (e.g. being with others who are drinking, at a bar, a club, a house party, etc.) as 
compared to contexts where they have learned to not expect heavy alcohol consumption (e.g. 
being alone, in school, at work/home) (Wall et al., 2000; Wall et al., 2001; Monk & Heim, 
2013a; Monk & Heim, 2013b; Monk & Heim, 2014; LaBrie et al., 2011; Reich et al., 2004; 
Reich et al., 2005). This hypothesis is consistent with EMA studies that have found that self-
reported levels of positive-negative affect (“happy” –  “sad”) and stimulation-sedation (“excited” 
– “sluggish”) tend to co-vary with drinking levels and the environmental/social contexts in which 
drinking occurs (Treloar et al., 2015; Piasecki, Wood, Shiffman, Sher, & Heath, 2012; Gautreau 
et al., 2015). We also hypothesized that the relationship between alcohol expectancies and 
contextual variables would be moderated by an individual’s typical drinking level 
(light/moderate vs. heavy), such that heavy drinkers would show the strongest relationship 
between positively-valenced alcohol expectancies and contextual variables when compared to 
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light/moderate drinkers (Reich et al., 2004; Reich et al., 2005). Heavy drinkers likely have 
stronger associational memory networks related to alcohol, since almost by definition they 
engage in alcohol consumption more frequently than other drinkers and therefore have had more 
experiences with which associations can form. A placebo-controlled study also found that heavy 
drinkers report more stimulating and rewarding (i.e. positive) subjective responses to alcohol 
consumption when compared to lighter drinkers (King, de Wit, McNamara, & Cao, 2011). Thus, 
heavy drinkers should be more sensitive to environmental stimuli that could activate alcohol 
expectancies, and it is likely that these activated alcohol expectancies would be more stimulating 
and positively valenced.  
Lastly, exploratory analyses examined whether an association between positively 
valenced alcohol expectancies and future alcohol consumption was moderated by baseline levels 
of explicitly measured alcohol expectancies (i.e. trait-like expectancies), religiosity, and facets of 
impulsivity. Religiosity and religious group affiliation has been tied to both alcohol expectancies 
and alcohol consumption (Galen & Rogers, 2004; Patock-Peckham, Hutchinson, Cheong, & 
Nagoshi, 1997). Similarly, some facets of impulsivity, such as sensation seeking, negative 
urgency, and positive urgency, have been associated with alcohol consumption and alcohol-
related problems (Smith et al., 2007; Cyders et al., 2007; Cyders, Littlefield, Coffey, & Karyadi, 
2015). It is also possible that the more trait-like alcohol expectancies measured at baseline could 
influence the hypothesized relationships, since explicitly and implicitly measured expectancies 
can uniquely predict alcohol use/problems independent of each other (Reich et al., 2010). 
Therefore, it is plausible that religiosity, impulsivity, and trait-like alcohol expectancies 
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measured at baseline would moderate the anticipatory relationship between momentary alcohol 
expectancies and future alcohol consumption in the same day.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
METHODS 
Design 
 Ecological momentary assessment (EMA) is a particularly useful design strategy to 
measure alcohol expectancies and other variables repeatedly over time in natural environments 
(Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008). EMA and related methodological designs (e.g. ambulatory 
assessment) use repeated sampling of a person’s current/recent behaviors, cognitions, 
environments, etc. while the person is in their natural environment (Shiffman et al., 2008; Trull 
& Ebner-Priemer, 2012).  Such repeated samplings (or “events”) can capture the real-world 
dynamic processes and temporal relationships between variables of interest (Neal et al., 2006; 
Wray, Merrill, & Monti, 2014; Beckjord & Shiffman, 2014; Shiffman et al., 2008). Being able to 
measure cognitive processes in natural environments has been useful for testing whether results 
found in laboratory-based studies replicate in real-world experiences (e.g. emotion and 
psychopathology; Bylsma & Rottenberg, 2011). Other widely noted advantages of EMA include 
both better ecological validity and more reliable data due to less recall bias in self-reports 
(Beckjord & Shiffman, 2014; Shiffman et al., 2008). When modern technologies (e.g. mobile 
phones, biosensors, social media, GPS) are used to collect the repeated samples, EMA can 
become an especially powerful measurement tool due to increased precision (e.g. timely 
response; electronic time-stamps; predetermined assessment schedule) and temporally 
continuous measurements (Chung & Hilton, 2014; Neal et al., 2006; Cohn, Hunter-Reel, 
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Hagman, & Mitchell, 2011; Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2012; Wray et al., 2014; Greenfield, Bond, 
& Kerr, 2014; Freisthler et al., 2014; Harris & Knight, 2014). Therefore, although moving out of 
the laboratory may reduce “control” over confounding variables and potentially increases 
measurement error, the advantages of the EMA design still make it particularly well-suited for 
acquiring evidence to help answer our research questions. 
Given that EMA has already been used successfully in alcohol and other substance use 
research (Shiffman, 2009; Wray et al., 2014), we also used an EMA approach that takes 
advantage of readily available technology (i.e. mobile phones) to test our hypotheses regarding 
alcohol expectancies, context, and alcohol consumption (for a brief discussion on using mobile 
phones for EMA, see Kuntsche and Labhart, 2014). Specifically, participants in our study were 
prompted using their mobile phones to provide information regarding their current alcohol 
expectancies, affect, context, and drinking status. These prompts occurred repeatedly over the 
course of a Tuesday, Friday, and Saturday in a week during the academic semester. Tuesday was 
chosen as a baseline comparison for Friday and Saturday because college age adults tend to 
consume much less alcohol on Tuesdays relative to Fridays and Saturdays (e.g. Del Boca, 
Darkes, Greenbaum, & Goldman, 2004).  Friday and Saturday were chosen because several 
studies have shown that these nights are when the highest percentage of many North American 
and European young adults drink alcohol and consume the largest quantities of alcohol 
(Tremblay et al., 2010; Wood, Sher, & Rutledge, 2007; Cleveland, Mallett, White, Turrisi, & 
Favero, 2013; Del Boca et al., 2004; Reich, Cummings, Greenbaum, Moltisanti, & Goldman, 
2015; Finlay, Ram, Maggs, & Caldwell, 2012; Kuntsche & Labhart, 2012; Wray et al., 2014). 
The late morning to evening hours (10:00am – 1:00am) were chosen because the evening hours 
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are when alcohol use and heavy drinking are most likely to occur for young adults, which is 
supported by findings from a couple of EMA studies with Swiss college students by Kuntsche 
and colleagues (Kuntsche & Labhart, 2012; Kuntsche & Labhart, 2013; Thrul & Kuntsche, 2015; 
Kuntsche, Otten, & Labhart, 2015). These researchers successfully utilized hourly mobile phone 
assessments to collect alcohol consumption and contextual information (e.g. location, number of 
people present) from participants over the course of multiple weekend evenings, demonstrating 
the feasibility of repeated, hourly mobile phone assessments of alcohol use with young adults. 
Some of their findings include different hourly drinking patterns during the evening (e.g. stable 
vs. accelerated) and different hourly drinking patterns on different days of the week; they also 
found that having more friends present at a given time point during the evening was associated 
with more self-reported alcohol consumption at that time point.  Relatedly, Twitter posts in the 
United States with content related to alcohol intoxication have been found to peak during the 
evening hours of 9pm to 2am on the weekends (West et al., 2012). However, the assessment 
prompts in our study began at 10:00am because our goal of testing the anticipatory relationship 
of alcohol expectancies and future alcohol consumption requires assessing alcohol expectancies 
before drinking begins. Therefore, we used mobile phone assessments that were delivered 
repeatedly in 3 hour intervals over the course of Tuesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays between the 
hours of 10:00am and 1:00am in order to maximize our chances of capturing the anticipatory 
relationship of alcohol expectancies and future alcohol consumption, as well as the general 
covariation of alcohol expectancies, contextual variables, and alcohol consumption.  
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Measures 
 Demographics. The general demographic information collected included age, gender, 
ethnicity, and religious affiliation. Simple face valid questions were used to gather the 
demographic information (i.e. “What is your age?”, etc.).   
 Baseline Measurements. Baseline measurements that were gathered included explicit 
trait-like alcohol expectancies, facets of impulsivity, religiosity, and alcohol drinking history. 
Explicit alcohol expectancies were measured using the Alcohol Expectancy Multiaxial 
Assessment short form (A.E. Max; Goldman & Darkes, 2004). Averaged scores can range from 
0 (“Never”) to 6 (“Always”). We initially calculated the averages for each of the 3 higher order 
factors of the A.E. Max short form (i.e. sedating, negative, positive-arousing) reported by 
Goldman and Darkes (2004); however, since the sedating and negative factors were strongly 
correlated (r = 0.58), we combined those two factors into one. The two resulting A.E. Max 
factors, negative-sedating and positive-arousing, had good internal reliability, α = 0.89 and α = 
0.92 respectively (all reliability estimates were obtained from data collected in the present 
study).  
Facets of impulsivity were measured using the short version of the UPPS-P Impulsive 
Behavior Scale (SUPPS-P; Cyders et al., 2015). Averaged scores can range from 1 (“Agree 
Strongly”) to 4 (“Disagree Strongly”). The SUPPS-P contains 3 higher-order factors: emotion-
based rash action (α = 0.83), sensation seeking (α = 0.72), and deficits in conscientiousness (α = 
0.79). These three factors are theorized to tap into different facets of the larger impulsivity 
construct, and higher scores on these factors indicate greater impulsivity.  
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Religiosity was measured using the Duke Religion Index, with higher scores indicating 
greater religiosity (Storch et al., 2004). Because the first two items are scored differently (1 to 6, 
instead of 1 to 5 like the other three items), averaged scores can range from 1 to 5.4. The 
religiosity factor had good reliability (α = 0.91). 
Alcohol drinking history was measured using general quantity-frequency questions 
developed by researchers at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that were modified 
to distinguish binge drinking from “usual” drinking, since this modification may produce a more 
accurate estimate of a person’s drinking habits (Stahre, Naimi, Brewer, & Holt, 2006). The 
questions, based on those from Stahre et al. (2006), were as follows: “During the past 30 days, 
how many days per week did you have at least one drink of any alcoholic beverage? Considering 
all types of alcoholic beverages, how many days during the past 30 days did you have 5 or more 
drinks on an occasion? On the days when you drank less than 5 alcoholic beverages, about how 
many drinks did you drink on average?” The modified quantity-frequency index is simply the 
product of the frequency of non-binge drinking days and the average non-binge quantity, plus the 
product of the frequency of binge-drinking days and 5 (Stahre et al., 2006; 5 is the cut-off for 
binge-drinking using this index); the result was then divided by 30 to produce the drinks per day 
index.  This index served as the alcohol drinking history variable. 
The A.E. Max factors, SUPPS-P factors, religiosity, and alcohol drinking history 
variables were each grand-mean centered so that 0 represents the average score across all 
participants, positive scores indicate that a person is above the sample average for that variable, 
and negative scores indicate that a person is below the sample average for that variable.  
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In-Vivo Alcohol Expectancies. Alcohol expectancies were measured using a word 
association task known as free association, which is theorized to tap into implicit memory 
(Nelson et al., 1998; Nelson, McEvoy, & Dennis, 2000; Stacy, Ames, & Leigh, 2004; Stacy, 
Ames, & Grenard, 2006; Rooke, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2008). Free association often involves 
simply asking participants to provide the first words that come to mind when responding to 
open-ended prompts, such as “Alcohol makes me _____” (Stacy et al., 2004; Stacy et al., 2006; 
Reich & Goldman, 2005; Dunn & Goldman, 2000; Reich, Ariel, Darkes, & Goldman, 2012; 
Nelson et al., 2000). The probability of responding to the prompt with any given word (e.g. 
“sick”) is thought to measure the relative strength of implicit memory associations to a target 
word/concept (e.g. “alcohol”; Nelson et al., 1998; Nelson et al., 2000). Relative strength refers to 
the notion that the strength of association between two concepts in memory (i.e. the probability 
of responding to a free association prompt with a particular word) at any given time is heavily 
dependent on a person’s past experiences and immediate context at the time of responding, 
which makes free association essentially a measure of state (vs. trait) cognitions. Being able to 
probe state cognitions is also why free association is ideal for measuring both the momentary 
anticipatory motivational processes that may guide future alcohol consumption and the 
covariation of alcohol expectancies and drinking-related contextual variables.  
To measure the anticipatory processing system more precisely, the typical free associate 
instructions were modified to include future-oriented contingencies and wording. Therefore, 
participants were instructed to “Think about the rest of your day. Fill in the blanks with the first 
word that you think of. Answer as fast as you can. Drinking alcohol will make me __________." 
This free associate prompt served as an implicit measure of state alcohol expectancies in this 
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study. Participants received the latter sentence of the prompt 5 times in a row during each 
assessment time point in order to obtain a maximum of 5 free associates per assessment time 
point.  
Word association tasks have already been successfully used to measure alcohol-related 
cognitions (including expectancies) that predict alcohol use, indicating their usefulness as 
implicit measures of alcohol-related cognitions (Rooke et al., 2008; Stacy et al., 2004; Stacy et 
al., 2006; Dunn & Goldman, 2005; Reich & Goldman, 2005; Reich et al., 2010; Goldman, Reich, 
& Darkes, 2006). Alcohol-related cognitions measured using a word association task have also 
been found to differentiate among heavy and light drinkers in a college student sample (Stacy, 
Leigh, & Weingardt, 1997), but not in a sample of high-risk youths (Stacy, Galaif, Sussman, & 
Dent, 1996). Having more drinking experiences and imagining different contexts have predicted 
the strength of association in memory between positive outcomes and alcohol-related cognitions 
measured using word association tasks (Stacy, Leigh, & Weingardt, 1994).  Further, implicitly 
measured alcohol-related cognitions can be positioned on semantic dimensions that reflect 
valence (positive – negative) and arousal (exciting – sedating); the positions of alcohol-related 
cognitions along these dimensions have been found to predict alcohol drinking levels (Wiers et 
al., 2007; Dunn & Goldman, 2005; Reich & Goldman, 2005; Reich et al., 2012; Goldman, Reich, 
& Darkes, 2006), although there are likely to be cultural differences in the precise patterns of 
prediction (Mahoney, Graham, Cottrell, & Kim, 2011).  
Free associates have often been scored using group-level probabilities which are 
determined by dividing the number of participants who respond with a given free associate by 
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the total number of participants (e.g. Nelson et al., 2000; Reich & Goldman, 2005). Although 
this approach is useful for obtaining a general descriptive survey of which free associates are 
most common for a given sample, this approach has two weaknesses that make it undesirable for 
our study. First, measuring within-person changes requires scores for individual participants, 
which group-level probabilities do not provide. Second, unique free associate responses 
generated by a large group of participants can number in the hundreds or thousands (i.e. 
hundreds or thousands of variables), which is problematic for analyses and often requires using 
only a few of the most frequently mentioned free associates. Including only the most frequent 
free associates may result in a substantial loss of useful information obtained by the free 
associate prompts. Given the weaknesses of using general group-level probabilities, it is 
preferable to use a scoring method for free associates that both aggregates scores across unique 
free associates and produces scores for individual participants. 
To quantify free associate responses in our study, two different scoring schemes were 
combined. The first scoring scheme was to rate each free associate word along a valence 
dimension. These ratings were obtained from unpublished data from a longitudinal study in 
which the drinking levels and alcohol-related cognitions of roughly 600 college students at this 
same university were tracked for 5 years (see Reich et al., 2015). During that study, students 
were asked to rate each free associate word from “extremely unpleasant” to “extremely pleasant” 
(i.e. valence). Scores could range from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating more pleasantness 
(i.e. more positive valence) and lower scores indicating more unpleasantness (i.e. more negative 
valence). The mean pleasantness ratings of each free associate word from that study were used as 
the valence scores for the free associate words in this study. These valence scores were then 
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centered around the scale mean (= 4) to allow for negative valence scores, because lower scores 
indicate unpleasantness (i.e. negative valence) and not merely less pleasantness (i.e. positive 
valence). This distinction is important when applying the salience weights to the valence scores 
(see next section).  
The second scoring scheme uses a simple saliency index (Smith’s S index) developed by 
cognitive anthropologists to identify the most salient items of any cultural-cognitive domain 
when a free-listing task is used (Smith, 1993; corrected formula in Sutrop, 2001; Thompson & 
Juan, 2006; see Appendix A). This salience index was used for two reasons. First, it is intuitive 
that the first words mentioned on an open-ended list represent the most salient concepts in mind 
at that moment (Smith, 1993). Second, it is theorized that the first words produced in response to 
free-association tasks are more reliable indicators of the relative strength in memory between the 
concept represented by the free associate prompt and the concepts represented by the free 
associate responses (Nelson et al., 2000). Using this salience index effectively gives more weight 
to the first free associate responses provided by a participant at any given time point. The index 
uses the length of a participant’s free associate list (i.e. total number of free associates generated) 
and the rank of a given free associate word (i.e. the position of the word in the list) to create 
scores ranging from 0 to 1, in which a score of 0 represents a free associate word that was not 
listed by the participant and a score of 1 represents the first free associate word that was listed by 
the participant. Other words listed after the first word get a score between 0 and 1.  
The valence score for each word is then multiplied by the salience score for that word, so 
that the valence scores are essentially weighted by the salience score. For each time point, the 
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salience-weighted valence scores for all free associates that a person listed were summed 
together to create a total valence score for that time point. Although 8% of free associates could 
not be assigned a valence score even after data cleaning because of idiosyncratic responses, 
summing the scale-mean centered valence scores effectively treats these unscored free associates 
as having a neutral valence (= 0). Finally, these total salience-weighted valence scores were 
person-mean centered, so that 0 represented the average valence score for each person across the 
entire study, positive scores indicate that a person is above their own average (i.e. more 
positively valenced), and negative scores indicate that a person is below their own average (i.e. 
more negatively valenced). This person-mean centered salience-weighted valence score was the 
primary measure of in-vivo alcohol expectancies. We also included the valence person-means as 
a covariate in order to account for any between-person differences in general alcohol expectancy 
valence, and thus further distinguish within-person changes in alcohol expectancy valence from 
between-person differences (a.k.a. “contextual effects” model; Feaster, Brincks, Robbins, & 
Szapocznik, 2011).  The person-mean centered salience-weighted valence scores of the free 
associate responses had good reliability (α = 0.71). Using person-mean centered scores allows 
for showing change at a particular measurement moment relative to that person’s own centered 
mean (i.e. within-person changes). 
In-Vivo State Affect. Although general state affect has been shown to be predictive of 
future alcohol consumption during the course of a day (Treloar et al., 2015), we hypothesized 
that alcohol expectancies would add incremental prediction over general state affect, since 
general affect and alcohol expectancies likely operate simultaneously (and interactively) to 
motivate alcohol-related behaviors. State affect was measured by the following prompt adapted 
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from Treloar et al. (2015), “Rate how you feel right now.” Participants then rated how “excited”, 
“happy”, “sad”, and “distressed” they currently feel on a Likert scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 5 
(“extremely”). The scores for “excited” and “happy” were averaged to create a positive affect 
score (“happy” and “excited” were strongly correlated, r = 0.67), and the scores for “sad” and 
“distressed” were averaged to create a negative affect score (“sad” and “distressed” were 
strongly correlated, r = 0.62). These affect scores were person-mean centered, so that 0 
represents the average positive (or negative) affect score for each person across the entire study, 
positive scores indicate that a person is above their own average positive mood (or negative 
mood), and negative scores indicate that a person is below their own average positive mood (or 
negative mood). The positive and negative affect person-means were also included as covariates 
to account for general between-person differences in positive and negative affect throughout the 
study (again, see “contextual effects” model; Feaster et al., 2011).  
 In-Vivo Alcohol Consumption. Recent alcohol consumption was measured by asking 
participants how many and what type of alcoholic beverages they have consumed in the past 
three hours, including any beverages they are currently drinking. The prompt asked, “How many 
of the following drinks have you drank in the past 3 hours? Type in 0 for all if you have not been 
drinking alcohol.” A list appeared below this question, where participants entered how many of 
each type of alcoholic drink they consumed. The alcoholic beverage types that were listed 
include beer, hard liquor (e.g. shots), wine, and “other”. Next to each type of beverage, there was 
an image of that particular drink taken from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism’s pocket guide for alcohol screenings (NIAAA, 2015).  
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Although we collected the number of drinks, we chose to dichotomously categorize 
alcohol consumption as either any drinking in the past 3 hours (= 1) or no alcohol consumed in 
the past 3 hours (= 0). Alcohol consumption was dichotomized partly because participants were 
allowed 1 hour and 30 minutes to complete the survey after it was sent, but the question asked 
for alcohol consumption in the past 3 hours. If a participant completed consecutive surveys either 
too close or too far in time from each other, it is possible that participants who interpret the 
prompt very literally will either double count the number of drinks they’ve had or may not report 
drinking that has occurred. Alcohol consumption reported at the previous time point was 
included as a covariate to also adjust for double counting drinks. Dichotomizing the drinking 
variable and including its value from the previous time point helps to somewhat ameliorate the 
problem of possible contamination resulting from double counting drinks or missing drinking 
that occurred, because the inherent dependency of reported drinking between a contaminated 
time point and the previous time point  may be accounted for by the covariate.  
In-Vivo Context. In keeping with the methods used in the previous alcohol EMA studies 
(e.g. Monk & Heim, 2014; Kuntsche et al., 2015; Piasecki et al., 2012; Smit et al., 2015), self-
reports about the participants’ environmental context and social context were used to measure 
contextual variables. Social context was measured using the following question, “How many 
men are you with right now?” and “How many women are you with right now?” To answer, 
participants select a single integer ranging from 0 to 6-or-more. Environmental context was 
measured using a fill-in-the-blank question, “Where are you right now?” Responses were coded 
into two categories for analysis: alcohol related (= 1) and non-alcohol related (= 0). Alcohol 
related locations included bars, pubs, clubs, parties, and football games. Using this coding 
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scheme, 121 observations (2.4 %) were categorized as being ‘alcohol-related’ and 4,930 (97.6%) 
were categorized as ‘not alcohol-related’ across all participants and time points. The questions 
for assessing these variables were intentionally few and short to minimize the potential for 
reactivity due to having longer assessment instruments which could alter the participants’ 
cognitions and/or behaviors.  
Participants 
 The participant sample (N = 426) consisted of undergraduate students enrolled in 
psychology courses from a large public university in the southeast United States who reported 
consuming any alcohol in the past 30 days and who currently use a smartphone. Although 
college students are possibly the least representative sample for making generalizations about the 
larger human population (i.e. WEIRD; see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), college 
students and college-age young adults are among the U.S. demographic groups that are most 
likely to participate in recent alcohol use, binge alcohol use, and heavy alcohol use (Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014; Naimi et al., 2003; Merrill & Carey, 
2016). Therefore, college students and college-age young adults seem to be the participants who 
are most likely to engage in alcohol consumption (and extreme alcohol consumption) on any 
given day, which is a useful characteristic for our study, since more true score variation in 
alcohol consumption allows for more reliable estimates of the covariance between alcohol 
consumption and other variables. 
 The participant sample was predominantly females (76%) with a mean age of 21 (SD = 
3.3). Although such a disproportionate gender ratio may raise concerns about the generalizability 
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of our findings for males, our relatively large sample size means that there were still about 100 
males in this dataset. The males also did not have more missing data than the females (see 
“Missing Data” section below), which increases our confidence in the reliability of any statistical 
inferences made about males in our sample. Age was centered so that 0 represents the youngest 
age (18 years old) in our sample. Gender was coded so that females were the reference group 
(females = 0, males = 1). The ethnic breakdown of the sample was 59% White, 24% Hispanic, 
8% Black, 6% Asian, and 3% other.  
Procedure 
 The demographic questions and baseline measures were administered during the mass-
testing that Introduction to Psychology students completed during the semester. When 
participants signed-up for the study on the online SONA system, they gave informed consent and 
entered in their primary cellphone numbers to which they received the study measures at the 
appropriate times. Participants received text messages with a web-link to the online survey which 
was hosted by Qualtrics, an online survey system commonly used by universities, organizations, 
and businesses. Qualtrics has survey templates that are compatible with smartphones and tablet 
sized electronics. The text messages with the web-links were sent using the Qualtrics mailer, 
which allowed for large numbers of text messages to be sent simultaneously to many participants 
according to a predetermined time schedule. The text messages were sent at 3 hour intervals 
between 10:00am and 1:00am (i.e. at 10:00am, 1:00pm, 4:00pm, 7:00pm, 10:00pm, and 1:00am) 
on Tuesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays during the academic school year. Time of day was centered 
so that 0 corresponds to 10am and 5 corresponds to 1am; day of the week was centered so that 0 
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corresponds to Tuesday and 1 corresponds to Friday and Saturday (i.e. weekday vs. weekend). 
Each participant only participated for one week (i.e. only 1 Tuesday, Friday, and Saturday triad), 
since we were primarily interested in hourly changes happening within a day (as opposed to 
differences between days). We avoided assessing participants on weekends which have been 
found to have atypical drinking levels and may add confounding influences to our results (e.g. 
Thanksgiving, New Year’s Eve, “Guavaween”, home football games, Spring Break; see Del 
Boca et al., 2004).  
All participants received the prompt at roughly the same moment, allowing for delays in 
wireless signals. Participants had 1 hour and 30 minutes to complete the survey for that time 
point before the survey link expired. When participants opened up the survey on Qualtrics, they 
completed the alcohol expectancy free associate question first, then the alcohol consumption 
question, then the environmental context question, then the social context question, and then the 
state affect questions. Once they started the survey, it took most participants 2 minutes or less to 
complete all the questions (~75% across all participants and time points) and only 5% of the 
surveys were completed in more than 7 minutes. Students received course credit based on how 
many EMA prompts they completed. 
Statistical Analyses 
 To examine the covariation of in-vivo alcohol expectancies, alcohol consumption, 
contextual variables, and baseline demographics, multilevel modeling (a.k.a. hierarchical linear 
models, random effects models, mixed effects models) was used to analyze the between-person 
and within-person variance in alcohol consumption (Curran & Bauer, 2011; Bauer, 2011; 
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Hertzog & Nesselroade, 2003). These analyses can test whether individuals who overall have 
more positively valenced alcohol expectancies are more likely to drink alcohol at any given hour 
(i.e. between-person differences); they can also test whether an individual who experiences an 
increase in positively valenced alcohol expectancies during the night, relative to their own 
average expectancy valence level, will tend to drink more alcohol as well (i.e. within-person 
changes). Furthermore, time-lagging key predictors of interest (e.g. expectancies, affect) was 
used to establish temporal precedence, which is crucial for supporting the causal claim that 
changes in alcohol expectancies directly influence alcohol consumption. 
  Analyses were conducted using PROC GLIMMIX and PROC MIXED in SAS (9.4) 
software. For PROC GLIMMIX analyses, the estimation method used was the maximum 
likelihood Laplace approximation, and the degrees of freedom were calculated using the 
“between-within” option. For PROC MIXED analyses, the estimation method used was 
maximum likelihood, and the degrees of freedom were also calculated using the “between-
within” option. Maximum likelihood estimation provides unbiased parameter estimates when 
data is missing at random, and less biased estimates than traditional techniques when data is 
missing not at random (Baraldi & Enders, 2010). 
Assumptions. The assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity for the level-2 
residuals were assessed using univariate descriptives and visual assessment (i.e. boxplots, Q-Q 
plots, histograms). Non-normality and heteroscedasticity were observed for the level-2 residuals 
in all models. To account for non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the residuals, the empirical 
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standard errors (“sandwich - classical”) provided by the SAS software were used to decrease the 
potential for a Type I error.  
 Time-Lagged Predictors. In order to strengthen the causal test of our time-varying 
predictors, alcohol expectancy valence, positive mood, and negative mood were time-lagged so 
that the scores obtained for these variables at the time point immediately before (i.e. 3 hours 
before) were matched to alcohol consumption at the next time point (T – 1). For example, 
alcohol expectancy valence measured at 1pm was matched with alcohol consumption at 4pm. As 
mentioned before, we also included alcohol drinking status (yes or no) at the previous time point 
as a predictor of drinking at the next time point to account for the autocorrelation of drinking 
status. This approach was used for methodological reasons (see Methods section) and to control 
for the possibility that observed relationships between expectancies at one time point and 
drinking at the next time point were spurious byproducts of the carryover of drinking across 
adjacent assessments (i.e. “behavior predicts behavior”).   
 Proposed Models. A separate multilevel analysis was conducted for each hypothesis. All 
multilevel analyses were 2-level analyses, with time of day (level-1) nested within persons 
(level-2). The following variables were time-varying variables and could be considered level-1 
(hourly level) predictors: lagged alcohol expectancy valence, lagged positive mood, lagged 
negative mood, lagged drinking status, alcohol-related contexts, time of day, and day of the 
week. The following variables were time-invariant and could be considered level-2 (person 
level) predictors: age, gender, past 30-day drinking, baseline alcohol expectancies, baseline 
impulsivity, religiosity, and the person-means for alcohol expectancy valence, positive mood, 
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and negative mood. For each outcome variable, a 2-level unconditional model with time of day 
(level-1) nested within persons (level-2) was created to determine how much variability was 
within persons and between persons (ICC). 
The main hypothesis (i.e. increases in positively-valenced alcohol expectancies should be 
observed a few hours to minutes before engaging in alcohol consumption) and the exploratory 
hypotheses regarding moderation of the main hypothesis by baseline alcohol expectancies, 
impulsivity, and religiosity, were tested using multilevel logistic regression because the outcome, 
alcohol consumption, was treated dichotomously. Thus, we were interested in predicting whether 
any alcohol consumption had occurred, but not the amount of alcohol consumption.  
 The equation for the multilevel logistic regression of the main hypothesis is shown in 
Appendix B. Drinkingti  is whether alcohol had been consumed during the past 3 hours for time 
of day  t  and participant  i, and  π0i  is the log odds of drinking for an 18 year old female at 10am 
on a weekday when all other covariates are at 0 for participant  i. Time of day was treated as a 
random effect (π1i), so that each participant had their own change in the log odds of drinking 
during the course of the day. The fixed effect level-1 predictors were weekend (π2), lagged 
positive mood (π3), lagged negative mood (π4), lagged alcohol consumption (π5), and lagged 
alcohol expectancy valence (π6), which each represented the change in the log odds of drinking 
per 1 unit increase in the predictor. The fixed effect level-2 predictors were age (β01), gender 
(β02), alcohol drinking history (β03), baseline positive-arousing alcohol expectancies (β04), 
baseline negative-sedating alcohol expectancies (β05), emotion-based rash action (β06), sensation 
seeking (β07), deficits in conscientiousness (β08), religiosity (β09), positive mood person-mean 
33 
 
(β010), negative mood person-mean (β011), and alcohol expectancy valence person-mean (β012), 
which each represented the change in the log odds of drinking per 1 unit increase in the 
predictor. For level-2, β00 was the average log odds of drinking at the first time point across all 
participants, β10 was the average change in the log odds of drinking over time of day across all 
participants, and r0i and r1i were the errors associated with the intercepts and change in the log 
odds of drinking over time, respectively.  The level-2 error terms were assumed to be normally 
distributed with τ00 representing the variance in the initial log odds of drinking, τ11 representing 
the variance in the change in the log odds of drinking over time, and τ10 representing the 
covariation between the residuals in the initial log odds of drinking and the change in the log 
odds of drinking over time. 
 The equations for the exploratory analyses were identical to the model in Appendix B, 
except that they included interactions between the baseline moderators and lagged expectancy 
valence (i.e. cross-level interactions). A separate model was created for each hypothesized 
baseline moderator, which resulted in 6 total models that were tested: 1 for religiosity, 2 for 
baseline alcohol expectancies, and 3 for baseline facets of impulsivity.  
The second hypothesis (i.e. increase in positively-valenced alcohol expectancies in 
alcohol-related contexts) and third hypothesis regarding moderation of the second hypothesis by 
baseline alcohol drinking history were tested using multilevel linear regression because the 
outcome, alcohol expectancy valence, was treated as normally distributed.  Thus, we were 
interested in predicting the degree of positively-valenced alcohol expectancy activation. 
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The equation for the multilevel linear regression of the second hypothesis was similar to 
the model for the main hypothesis, except that a linear mixed model was used and the outcome 
variable was alcohol expectancy valence for time of day  t  and participant  i  instead of alcohol 
consumption. A random intercept and a random effect for time of day were modeled. Fixed 
effect level-1 predictors included weekday, drinking status, and alcohol context. Fixed effect 
level-2 predictors were the same predictors from the main hypothesis, except that alcohol 
expectancy valence person-mean was not included due to criterion contamination (i.e. this 
variable is directly calculated using the scores from the outcome variable). There was also an 
error term at level-1 (eti) that was assumed to be distributed as N(0, σ2). The equation for the 
multilevel linear regression of the third hypothesis was identical to the model for the second 
hypothesis, except that it also included an interaction between baseline alcohol drinking history 
and alcohol context (i.e. cross-level interaction). 
  
35 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
RESULTS 
Missing Data 
 Maximum likelihood estimation provides unbiased parameter estimates when data is 
missing at random, and less biased estimates than traditional techniques when data is missing not 
at random. Although it is impossible to completely verify whether data is missing at random or 
missing not at random, it is still useful to examine the data for patterns of missing data (Baraldi 
& Enders, 2010). After removing 5 participants for reporting average drinks per drinking 
occasion during the EMA protocol that were over 3 standard deviations above the mean, a total 
of 421 participants were left for inclusion in the analyses. Table 1 provides a cross-table of the 
number of participants and the number of EMA assessments that were completed. The table 
shows that about 50% of the 421 participants contributed 13 or more assessment time points 
usable for these analyses (maximum possible time points is 18). The compliance rates by time of 
day were as follows: 71% at 10am, 76% at 1pm, 71% at 4pm, 71% at 7pm, 74% at 10pm, and 
40% at 1am. Compliance rates by day of the week (aggregating all hourly prompts within each 
day) were as follows: 74% on Tuesday, 67% on Friday, and 60% on Saturday. Therefore, 
missing data was more likely to occur at 1am and on Saturdays. To examine if missing data was 
related to any of the level-2 (person-level) variables, Bayesian linear models were used to 
directly test the evidence in favor of the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
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these variables and missing data (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Rouder & 
Morey, 2012). The total number of missing data points for each participant was used as the 
outcome variable. Table 2 shows the results of the Bayesian analyses for each variable. There 
was substantial evidence in favor of the null hypothesis for all predictor variables, except A.E. 
Max positive-arousing and alcohol expectancy valence person-mean (see Wetzels et al., 2011 for 
interpreting Bayes factors). Those two variables had equivocal evidence, meaning that the 
evidence was insufficient to clearly support the null or alternative hypothesis; given our 
relatively large sample size, the lack of strong evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis 
suggests that the magnitude of any non-null effect is likely to be small. We found the same 
patterns of missing data when we included only data used in the main hypothesis test. Therefore, 
at least for the variables that we were able to test, the risk of violating the missing at random 
assumption for maximum likelihood estimation appears to be minimal.  
Descriptives 
Across all participants and time points, alcohol consumption was reported on 17% of the 
assessments. Most of the drinking episodes (78%) were reported on weekend days (i.e. Friday 
and Saturday). For time of day, 5% of drinking episodes were reported between 10am – 1pm, 8% 
were reported between 1pm – 4pm, 22% were reported between 4pm – 7pm, 37% were reported 
between 7pm – 10pm, and 28% were reported between 10pm – 1am. Table 3 shows the 
descriptive statistics for level-2 (person-level) continuous predictors. Table 4 shows the 
descriptive statistics for level-1 (hourly-level) continuous predictors. The variables generally 
appeared to be normally distributed. Table 5 shows the correlations between level-2 predictors; 
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the two A.E. Max variables were moderately and positively correlated, as were rash action and 
deficits in conscientiousness. All other level-2 variables had either small correlations or were not 
correlated. Univariate correlations between the level-1 predictors showed that lagged positive 
mood was negatively correlated with lagged negative mood (r = -0.40, p < .01) and positively 
correlated with lagged alcohol expectancy valence (r = 0.21, p < .01). Lagged negative mood 
was negatively correlated with lagged alcohol expectancy valence (r = -0.11, p < .01). Most 
participants (62%) reported drinking alcohol at least once during the study. Therefore, concerns 
of non-normality, multicollinearity, and sparsity of drinking events appear to be minimal.  
Main Hypothesis: Expectancy Valance Predicts Future Drinking 
 To determine the ICC for the unconditional multilevel logistic model for alcohol 
consumption, we used the formula proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1999) in which a constant 
3.29 is used in place of a level-1 residual variance because level-1 residual variances that are 
directly estimated from a multilevel logistic model are often considered to be uninformative. The 
analysis indicated that about 29% of the variability in alcohol consumption was due to between-
person differences, and about 71% of the variability was due to within-person changes. 
Therefore, most of the changes in drinking were due to the state-like changes that participants 
experienced on an hourly or daily basis, as opposed to the more trait-like differences between 
participants that were constant throughout the study. This finding indicated that predictors which 
varied on an hourly or daily basis can potentially explain far more variance in alcohol 
consumption than predictors which were stable across days (e.g. demographic variables). 
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Table 6 shows the results of the multilevel logistic model predicting alcohol 
consumption. As predicted, the valence of the lagged alcohol expectancies was positively 
associated with alcohol consumption during the next 3 hours, after controlling for the other 
covariates in the model. More specifically, conversion of the log odds estimate for lagged 
alcohol expectancy valence to an odds ratio indicated that each 1 point increase was associated 
with a 12% increase in the odds of drinking alcohol during the next 3 hours. Multiplying that 
odds ratio with the standard deviation of the lagged alcohol expectancy valence scores (SD = 
2.41) indicated that a person who was 1 standard deviation more positively valenced than their 
own personal average alcohol expectancy valence level had a 29% higher odds of drinking 
alcohol in the next 3 hours. Figure 1 shows the prospective relationship between alcohol 
expectancy valence and future drinking based on the results of the model. As we hypothesized, 
therefore, increases in positively valenced alcohol expectancies were significantly predictive of 
engaging in alcohol consumption in the near future above and beyond the predictive effects of 
other important variables. 
The results of the exploratory analyses for the baseline moderators indicated that none of 
the interactions were significant after controlling for other important variables, p > .05. 
Therefore, we failed to find evidence that the predictive association between alcohol expectancy 
valence and future alcohol consumption was moderated by religiosity, explicitly measured 
positive expectancies, explicitly measured negative expectancies, sensation seeking, emotion-
based rash action, and deficits in conscientiousness. 
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Secondary Hypotheses: Expectancy Valence Associated with Alcohol Context 
To determine the ICC for the unconditional multilevel linear model for alcohol 
expectancy valence, the level-2 residual variance was divided by the total variability. The 
analysis indicated that about 42% of the variability in alcohol expectancy valence was due to 
between-person differences, and about 58% of the variability was due to within-person changes. 
Roughly equal amounts of the variability in in-vivo alcohol expectancy valence were due to the 
state-like changes that participants experienced on an hourly/daily basis and the more trait-like 
differences between participants that were constant throughout the study. Therefore, predictors 
which varied on an hourly or daily basis could potentially explain about the same amount of 
variance in in-vivo alcohol expectancy valence as predictors which were stable across days (e.g. 
demographic variables).  
Contrary to hypothesis 2, the multilevel linear model predicting alcohol expectancy 
valence indicated that being in an alcohol-related context was not significantly related to alcohol 
expectancy valence, p > .05. Although alcohol-related contexts had more positive alcohol 
expectancy valence than other contexts on average (see Figure 2), this difference was not 
significant. Thus, we failed to find evidence that being in an alcohol-related context would be 
associated with more positively valenced alcohol expectancies. Contrary to hypothesis 3, the 
model testing the baseline moderation of the second hypothesis indicated that the interaction was 
not significant, p > .05. Therefore, we failed to find evidence that any association between 
alcohol-related contexts and alcohol expectancy valence was moderated by alcohol drinking 
history.  
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Table 1. Cross-table of assessments included by number of participants. 
 
# of Assessments  
Contributed to the Analyses  
# of 
Participants 
% of 
Participants 
Cumulative % of 
Participants 
1 9 2% 2% 
2 12 3% 5% 
3 13 3% 8% 
4 8 2% 10% 
5 18 4% 14% 
6 12 3% 17% 
7 6 1% 19% 
8 16 4% 22% 
9 14 3% 26% 
10 17 4% 30% 
11 19 5% 34% 
12 27 6% 41% 
13 40 10% 50% 
14 47 11% 61% 
15 63 15% 76% 
16 52 12% 89% 
17 33 8% 96% 
18 15 4% 100% 
Note. Data from a total of 421 participants were included in these analyses. The total possible 
number of assessments that could be contributed was 18. 
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Table 2. Bayesian linear models predicting missing data. 
 
Level-2 Predictors Bayes Factor10 
Age 0.18 a 
Gender 0.23 a 
A.E. Max positive-arousing 0.62 b 
A.E. Max negative-sedating 0.20 a 
SUPPS-P rash action 0.24 a 
SUPPS-P sensation seeking 0.12 a 
SUPPS-P deficits in conscientiousness 0.13 a 
Religiosity 0.11 a 
Alcohol drinking history 0.17 a 
Negative mood person-mean  0.12 a 
Positive mood person-mean 0.15 a 
Alcohol expectancy valence person-mean 0.41 b 
Note. Separate Bayesian linear regressions for each variable as a predictor of missing data were 
conducted. The BayesFactor package in R was used for analyses. Prior r scale of 0.5 was used 
for the g priors in the models.  
a  = Substantial evidence for the null hypothesis.  
b = Equivocal evidence. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of level-2 (person-level; time invariant) continuous predictors. 
 
Level-2 Predictorsa Nb Mean SD Skew Kurtosis 
A.E. Max positive-arousing 419 3.45 0.97 -0.46 0.73 
A.E. Max negative-sedating 418 2.80 0.96 -0.31 -0.12 
SUPPS-P rash action 417 2.03 0.60 0.36 -0.11 
SUPPS-P sensation seeking 417 2.81 0.66 -0.30 -0.20 
SUPPS-P deficits in conscientiousness 417 1.72 0.43 0.38 -0.05 
Religiosity 418 2.46 1.26 0.48 -0.94 
Alcohol drinking history 379 0.81 0.72 1.81 3.83 
Negative mood person-mean  421 1.02 0.90 1.27 1.86 
Positive mood person-mean 421 2.17 1.03 0.21 -0.55 
Alcohol expectancy valence person-
mean 421 0.38 2.34 -0.06 -0.12 
Note. a These descriptives are from the raw, non-centered scores. bAlthough the total N was 421, 
a few participants had missing baseline data. N = number of participants; SD = standard 
deviation. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of level-1 (hourly-level; time varying) continuous predictors. 
 
Level-1 Predictorsa N Mean SD Skew Kurtosis 
Lagged negative mood 3505 0.01 0.74 0.97 3.03 
Lagged positive mood 3505 0.02 1.01 0.14 0.63 
Lagged alcohol expectancy valence 3518 0.09 2.41 -0.09 0.43 
Note. a These descriptives are from the person-centered scores. “Lagged” means that the scores 
from the previous time point (3 hours before) were matched to alcohol consumption at the next 
time point. N = number of observations; SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 5. Correlations between level-2 (person-level; time invariant) predictors. 
 
Level-2 Predictors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Negative mood person-mean           
2. Positive mood person-mean -0.07          
3. Alcohol expectancy valence person-mean -0.02 0.15*         
4. Age -0.12* -0.09 -0.02        
5. Drinks per day (30 days) 0.06 0.13 0.21* -0.02       
6. A.E. Max positive-arousing 0.08 0.13 0.11 -0.06 0.17*      
7. A.E. Max negative-sedating 0.08 -0.12 -0.26* 0.00 -0.11 0.34*     
8. SUPPS-P rash action 0.25* -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.18* 0.16* 0.06    
9. SUPPS-P sensation seeking -0.08 0.13* 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.14   
10. SUPPS-P deficits in conscientiousness 0.06 -0.11* 0.06 -0.08 0.12 -0.05 -0.05 0.35* -0.08  
11. Religiosity -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.12 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 
Note. * p < .01. 
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Table 6. Logistic multilevel model predicting alcohol consumption. 
Parameters  Parameter Estimates 
Fixed Effects Predictors  
   Intercept (β00) -5.50 (0.41)* 
   Time of day (β10) 0.70 (0.08)* 
   Weekend (π2) 1.08 (0.15)* 
   Lagged positive mood (π3) 0.26 (0.07)* 
   Lagged negative mood (π4) 0.03 (0.10) 
   Lagged alcohol consumption (π5) 2.32 (0.22)* 
   Lagged alcohol expectancy valence (π6) 0.11 (0.03)* 
   Age (β01) 0.05 (0.02)* 
   Gender (β02) 0.46 (0.20)* 
   Alcohol drinking history (β03) 0.40 (0.12)* 
   Positive-arousing alcohol expectancy (β04) 0.08 (0.10) 
   Negative-sedating alcohol expectancy (β05) 0.13 (0.10) 
   Emotion-based rash action (β06) 0.13 (0.16) 
   Sensation seeking (β07) -0.19 (0.13) 
   Deficits in conscientiousness (β08) 0.12 (0.21) 
   Religiosity (β09) -0.06 (0.07) 
   Positive mood person-mean (β010) 0.01 (0.09) 
   Negative mood person-mean (β011) -0.27 (0.11)* 
   Alcohol expectancy valence person-mean (β012) 0.19 (0.04)* 
  
Variance Estimates  
   Level-2 intercept variance (τ00) 1.69 (0.89)* 
   Level-2 slope variance (τ11) 0.09 (0.07) 
   Level-2 intercept-slope covariance (τ10) -0.29 (0.21) 
Note. Parameter estimates are log odds. Alcohol consumption is binary: 0 = no drinking, 1 = any 
drinking. Time of day is centered so that 0 corresponds to 10am. Weekend is coded so that 0 is 
Tuesday and 1 is Friday and Saturday. Age is centered so that 0 is 18 years-old. Lagged moods 
and expectancy valence are person-mean centered. Baseline variables are grand-mean centered. 
Empirical standard errors (SE) follow parameter estimates in parentheses. β’s are level-2 
predictors and π’s are level-1 predictors. “Lagged” means that the scores from the previous time 
point (3 hours before) were matched to alcohol consumption at the next time point. * p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Probability of drinking alcohol during the next 3 hours by expectancy valence. 
Notes. The predicted probabilities of drinking alcohol during the next 3 hours by alcohol 
expectancy valence, based on the results of the logistic multilevel model. Shaded area represents 
the 95% confidence interval. The figure represents predicted probabilities for a 21 year old male 
at 7pm on the weekend who consumed an average amount of alcohol in the past 30 days, is 
experiencing an average positive and negative mood relative to himself, has not consumed any 
alcohol in the past 3 hours, and has average trait levels of alcohol expectancy, impulsivity, 
positive mood, negative mood, and religiosity relative to other participants in the sample. 
“Average” refers to grand-means and person-means. 
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Figure 2. Alcohol expectancy valence by alcohol context type. 
Notes. Predicted alcohol expectancy valence means and 95% confidence intervals, after 
controlling for other covariates and based on the results of the multilevel linear model. Although 
alcohol expectancy valence was more positive in alcohol-related contexts, this difference was not 
significant (p > .05) 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
DISCUSSION 
Our findings supported the main hypothesis that fluctuations in alcohol expectancies 
would reliably predict alcohol consumption in the next few hours. This association remained 
present even after accounting for important variables that fluctuate within a day (e.g. positive and 
negative mood) and trait-like characteristics of the participants (e.g. questionnaire-based 
impulsivity and alcohol expectancies, alcohol drinking history, gender) that have been previously 
shown to predict future alcohol consumption. By applying a “contextual effects” model, we also 
controlled for each participant’s average mood and alcohol expectancy valence throughout the 
entire study.  After accounting for many alcohol-related covariates, an increase of more 
positively valenced alcohol expectancies, relative to one’s own average expectancy level, 
reliably increased the odds of drinking alcohol during the next few hours.  These results support 
the consideration of expectancy processes as part of the larger motivational system that is 
theorized to generate alcohol consumption. Further, these results reveal that expectancy 
processes may include a dynamic element (i.e. they can change rapidly in real-time and are not 
merely static indicators) that can be distinguished from general affective traits and states, which 
are also likely causal mechanisms that guide future behaviors. 
A number of features in our study also provide evidence for a causal motivational link 
between positively valenced alcohol expectancies and alcohol consumption. Although the 
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concept of causation and how to establish causal claims is a hotly contested topic (e.g. Pearl, 
2010), medical and social scientists have traditionally used criteria such as strength of 
association, temporal sequence, and experimental manipulation when evaluating causal claims in 
research (e.g. Hill, 1965). In our particular study, some of the criteria for causal claims were 
established by the use of time-lags and within-person centering to restructure our data and recode 
the alcohol expectancy valence scores. Pairing the alcohol expectancy valence scores observed at 
each time point to the drinking status of the individual during the next 3 hours helped to establish 
the temporal precedence of changes in alcohol expectancy valence occurring prior to alcohol 
consumption. Within-person centering of the alcohol expectancy valence scores helped to 
establish that the prediction of future alcohol consumption was due to within-person changes in 
the anticipatory motivational system and not merely between-person differences. That these 
findings represented within-person changes in alcohol expectancy valence above and beyond 
between-person differences was also supported by the use of 2 different between-person 
measures of alcohol expectancy valence as covariates: the alcohol expectancy valence person-
means from the EMA portion of the study and the A.E. Max factors obtained at baseline. Other 
plausible third variable explanations of the association between in-vivo alcohol expectancy 
valence and future drinking were included as covariates. Including drinking status at the previous 
time point and baseline alcohol drinking history as covariates suggest that our findings should 
not be explained away as merely “A predicts A” or “behavior predicts behavior”. Time of day 
and weekend status were included as covariates because they are useful proxies for 
environmental and social contingencies that have been linked with alcohol consumption (e.g. 
sleep-wake cycles, school/work schedules, hanging out with friends). We also accounted for 
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participants’ average mood levels during the study and recent deviations from those average 
mood levels, which suggests that the alcohol expectancy valence measure is more than just a 
proxy for general mood states. In this way, the structuring of the data to ensure temporal 
precedence and the inclusion of many plausible third variables as covariates strengthens the case 
for a causal link between positively valenced alcohol expectancies and alcohol consumption 
assessed in-vivo. 
These findings build on and advance previous research in a number of ways. While many 
studies have already shown that alcohol expectancies predict alcohol consumption in the long-
term (e.g. months, years) and that manipulating expectancies in the laboratory influences alcohol 
consumption, we have now provided evidence for alcohol expectancies predicting future alcohol 
consumption in the short-term (i.e. hourly, within the same day) and outside of the laboratory 
while people are living their everyday lives. As a consequence, we may infer that alcohol 
expectancies can be dynamic and fluctuate during the course of a day, and that these fluctuations 
can be systematically linked to future alcohol consumption in that same day. More broadly, the 
findings lend further support to the notion that expectancies are a key part of the anticipatory 
motivational system that guides behavior. As the anticipation of a stimulus or activity becomes 
more positively valenced and rewarding, future behaviors will become more energized towards 
pursuing that stimulus or activity (i.e. increased motivational direction and vigor; Simpson & 
Balsam, 2015). If expectancies do indeed play a key role in motivating future behaviors, then 
these findings also support the inclusion of the expectancy concept in many of the major theories 
of addiction because these theories emphasize the identification and description of motivational 
mechanisms for compulsive drug use (Volkow, Koob, & McClellan, 2016; Meyer, King, & 
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Ferrario, 2015; Robinson & Berridge, 2003; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Moss & Albery, 2009; 
Wiers et al., 2007).  
Other advances of our study include methodological techniques for probing the 
anticipatory motivational system in-vivo using implicit probes. To our knowledge, no other 
studies have measured drug related free associates multiple times within a single day and outside 
of the laboratory. Further, to our knowledge, no other studies have weighted drug related free 
associates using a salience index that accounts for the list length and ranks of the free associates 
within the list. Giving more weight to the first free associate responses is important because the 
first words mentioned on an open-ended list represent the most salient concepts in mind at that 
moment and the first words mentioned are more reliable indicators of the relative strength in 
memory between the concept represented by the free associate prompt and the concepts 
represented by the free associate responses. Although we did not find evidence of alcohol free 
associates being linked to alcohol-related contexts, our findings did link alcohol free associates 
to prospective alcohol consumption. Given the many theoretical advantages of free associates 
discussed previously (see Methods section), it appears that using a free association task as part of 
an EMA procedure can be an effective and time-efficient method for probing in-vivo implicit 
memory network activation that is related to the motivational pathways that guide future 
behavior.  
Our study’s failure to find evidence of an association between alcohol free associate 
valence and alcohol-related contexts is somewhat surprising and notable, given that plenty of 
previous research supported an association between them. Although it is possible that no link can 
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be found between alcohol expectancies and alcohol-related contexts outside the laboratory, it is 
likely that the method we used to measure environmental context did not have enough precision 
for a proper test of our second hypothesis. In order to maximize compliance and keep participant 
burden to a minimum, we purposefully measured environmental context using an open-ended 
prompt, which can allow for both very detailed and very broad responses. In doing so, however, 
the variable we created to represent alcohol-related vs. non-alcohol-related contexts may have 
been too imprecise. For instance, participants who were either hosts or guests at house parties 
may have answered the prompt with “at home” or “at a friend’s house”, rather than “at a party”, 
which would change their categorization on the alcohol-related context variable. Since most 
participants were under the legal drinking age, it seems likely that much of their drinking would 
occur in non-regulated locations, such as homes, rather than at more regulated establishments, 
such as bars or clubs, which may have resulted in many inaccurate categorizations on the context 
variable. Inaccurate categorizations on the context variable would lead to unreliable estimates of 
the association between alcohol expectancies and alcohol-related contexts; this may be 
evidenced by the relatively low number of time points that were categorized as ‘alcohol-related’ 
(2.4%). The low number of contexts categorized as ‘alcohol-related’ also led to larger error 
margins and less power, which can be seen in Figure 2. These difficulties in accurately 
classifying alcohol-related contexts may also explain why we failed to find evidence for the 
baseline moderation of any relationship between alcohol expectancies and alcohol-related 
contexts. Future studies could improve the test for a relationship between alcohol expectancies 
and alcohol-related contexts by having more standardized and/or close-ended questions that may 
more precisely assess environmental context. 
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We also did not find evidence for baseline moderation of the relationship between 
alcohol expectancies and alcohol consumption. However, since no other studies have examined 
the covariation between alcohol expectancies and future alcohol consumption in-vivo using an 
EMA procedure, our hypotheses regarding baseline moderation of any such covariation were 
largely exploratory. And so, these null findings for baseline moderation should be considered 
preliminary. 
One possible limitation to our study is related to how we scored free associates. Scoring 
free associate responses can be challenging and requires careful deliberation of the pros and cons 
of whatever scoring method is chosen. To efficiently maximize the number of free associates 
scored in this study, we took advantage of previously collected valence ratings of free associates 
from a different sample of college students. However, it is not guaranteed that the valence ratings 
from that college student sample would be identical to the college students in the current sample 
had we collected those ratings from this sample. Relatedly, imputing valence scores that are 
averages of an entire student sample presumes that all students would rate the free associate 
words similarly, which is an assumption that previous research would not support (Reich et al., 
2012). Besides any between-person differences, the valence of any given free associate word 
might change within-persons and be temporally contingent; for example, the same person might 
rate the valence of “drunk” as having different valence scores at 10am, 7pm, and 1am. 
Nonetheless, the internal reliability of the valence ratings in this sample was good, especially 
given that many other implicit measures of cognition tend to have questionable reliability (Reich 
et al., 2010). Other possible limitations include the lack of experimental manipulation and the 
generalizability of our findings to other contexts and/or populations. Causal inference is most 
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strongly based upon experimental manipulation, and we did not experimentally manipulate 
alcohol expectancy valence. Although we controlled for many plausible third variables, there 
may be other unaccounted for third variables that can explain the observed relationship between 
alcohol expectancy valence and alcohol consumption. The generalizability of our findings is 
limited to a college student sample, which can be problematic for inferring to most other human 
populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). It is also unknown whether collecting the 
same data during holidays, large sporting event days, or other days that have been shown to have 
atypical alcohol consumption levels would produce different results, since we purposely avoided 
collecting data on such days.  
Another limitation was to specifically ask for alcohol consumption in the past 3 hours 
during the EMA portion of the study. If a participant completed consecutive surveys either too 
close or too far in time from each other, it is possible that participants who interpreted the prompt 
very literally will either double count the number of drinks they’ve had or may not report 
drinking that has occurred. An alternative phrasing that may seem, at first, to improve our 
question would be to have asked about drinking “…since the last time you completed the 
previous survey” instead of “… in the past 3 hours.” However, this alternative phrasing assumes 
that a participant completes all the surveys (a highly unrealistic assumption); if a participant fails 
to complete a preceding survey(s), that participant may then count all drinks consumed over the 
past 6 (or 9 or 12) hours, instead of 3 hours. The resulting variability in time spans would make it 
difficult to interpret this variable and threatens the validity of our method for measuring the 
buildup of positive alcohol expectancy valence proximal to drinking. Similarly, although 
dichotomizing the drink counts begs the question of why we did not simply ask a dichotomous 
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alcohol question, we preferred to obtain more detailed alcohol consumption information that may 
be useful for further exploratory analyses; the benefit of having richer drinking data that could be 
transformed into a dichotomous variable outweighed the cost of minimally increasing participant 
burden by asking for the number of specific drinks. Therefore, despite the possible 
contamination of specifically asking for alcohol consumption in the past 3 hours and 
dichotomizing the drinking, dichotomous alcohol consumption in the past 3-hours was used as 
the primary measure of in-vivo alcohol consumption. 
Our findings provide solid groundwork for future research. An extension of this study 
that would improve the argument that alcohol expectancies cause changes in drinking status in-
vivo is to experimentally manipulate expectancies in-vivo and see whether there is a resulting 
change in drinking levels. One way to manipulate expectancies would be to create a brief 
expectancy challenge intervention that could be delivered using ecological momentary 
intervention procedures, which are identical to EMA procedures but with the added complexity 
of determining when is the best moment to deliver the intervention (EMI; Beckjord & Shiffman, 
2007). Identifying when the anticipatory motivational system is building up in preparation for 
alcohol consumption and then delivering a “just-in-time” challenge to the motivational system in 
order to sway alcohol consumption in the near future would be a stronger test for the causal 
relationship that our findings currently suggest. Other studies may focus on optimizing the 
assessment of alcohol expectancies in-vivo. Although we demonstrated the utility of free 
association for in-vivo assessments in this study, future studies may examine other methods for 
assessing alcohol expectancies, whether they be more explicit (e.g. abbreviated versions of 
traditional expectancy questionnaires) or more implicit (e.g. stroop tasks; implicit association 
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tests). It would be critical for those studies to determine how much true score variability in 
alcohol expectancies such methods are able to capture, since it may difficult, particularly for the 
more explicit questionnaire-based measures, to identify subtle changes in alcohol expectancies 
throughout the day. Another follow-up to our study would be to assess if fluctuations in alcohol 
expectancies predict quantity of alcohol consumption, instead of just predicting whether drinking 
occurred or not.  Finally, testing whether our results generalize to people from other cultural 
backgrounds would also be particularly useful, since it is possible that different patterns of 
association between alcohol expectancies and drinking will emerge (e.g. Mahoney et al., 2011).  
The theoretical and empirical foundation of this study suggested that expectancies are 
part of dynamic motivational processes that guide daily behavior, and thus would guide future 
behavior even within the span of a few hours. Our findings within the alcohol domain build on 
that foundation by providing evidence that such processes can be probed in real-time using well-
established measures of implicit cognition, and that those processes are indeed predictive of 
behaviors in the near future.   
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APPENDIX A: 
SALIENCE INDEX 
 The Smith’s salience (S) index for each free associate word produced by each participant 
can be calculated by taking the total number of free associate words a participant mentioned at a 
given time point, subtracting the position/rank of the particular word, adding 1, and then dividing 
that value by the total number of free associate words for that participant at that time (Sutrop, 
2001). For example, a participant might give the following 3 free associates in order at 8pm: 
tired, relaxed, sick. The S index for ‘tired’ would be (3 – 1 + 1) / 3 = 1.0; the S index for 
‘relaxed’ would be (3 – 2 + 1) / 3 = .67; and the S index for ‘sick’ would be (3 – 3 + 1) / 3 = .33. 
To find an aggregate S index for a particular word for a group of N participants, we could simply 
take the average of the group’s S index scores for the particular word (i.e. Σ(S index) / N). Values 
for the aggregated S index can range between 0 and 1, with a score of 1 indicating that a word 
was listed as the first free associate by every participant and 0 indicating that a word was never 
listed as a free associate by any participant. Thus, this index can be considered a measure of how 
salient words/concepts are when using a free-listing task, such as free association word lists 
(Smith, 1993; Thompson & Juan, 2006). 
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APPENDIX B: 
MULTILEVEL EQUATIONS 
The equation for the multilevel logistic regression model for the main hypothesis is as follows: 
Level-1 equation 
Drinkingti = π0i + π1i Timeti + π2 Weekendti + π3 Lagged positive moodti +  
π4 Lagged negative moodti + π5 Lagged alcohol consumptionti +  
π6 Lagged alcohol expectancy valenceti 
 
Level-2 equations 
π0i = β00 + β01 Agei + β02 Genderi + β03 Alcohol drinking historyi +  
β04 Positive-arousing alcohol expectancyi + β05 Negative-sedating alcohol expectancyi +
 β06 Emotion-based rash actioni + β07 Sensation seekingi +  
β08 Deficits in conscientiousnessi + β09 Religiosityi + β010 Positive mood person-meani + 
β011 Negative mood person-meani + β012 Alcohol expectancy valence person-meani + r0i 
 
π1i = β10 + r1i 
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Title: Anticipatory Motivation for Drinking Alcohol: An In-Vivo Study 
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Dear Mr. Benitez: 
 
On 8/16/2016, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the 
above application and all documents contained within, including those outlined below. 
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Thesis Online Consent form.docx (granted a waiver) 
 
77 
 
 
 
*Please use only the official IRB stamped informed consent/assent document(s) found under 
the "Attachments" tab. Please note, these consent/assent document(s) are only valid during the 
approval period indicated at the top of the form(s).  Consents granted a waiver are not 
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It was the determination of the IRB that your study qualified for expedited review which 
includes activities that (1) present no more than minimal risk to human subjects, and (2) 
involve only procedures listed in one or more of the categories outlined below. The IRB may 
review research through the expedited review procedure authorized by 45CFR46.110. The 
research proposed in this study is categorized under the following expedited review category: 
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, 
research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural 
beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, 
focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. 
 
Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirements for the documentation of informed consent 
as outlined in the federal regulations at 45CFR46.117(c) which states that an IRB may waive the 
requirement for the investigator to obtain a signed consent form for some or all subjects if it 
finds either: (1) That the only record linking the subject and the research would be the consent 
document and the principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of 
confidentiality. Each subject will be asked whether the subject wants documentation linking the 
subject with the research, and the subject's wishes will govern; or (2) That the research presents 
no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for which written 
consent is normally required outside of the research context.  (Online Consent form). 
 
 
 
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in 
accordance with IRB policies and procedures and as approved by the IRB. Any changes to the 
approved research must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval via an amendment. 
Additionally, all unanticipated problems must be reported to the USF IRB within five (5) 
calendar days. 
 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University 
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.  If you have 
any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson 
USF Institutional Review Board 
